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Multi-Sector Strategies for
Collaboration in Underwater
Unexploded Ordnance Remediation
By Chris Price [ Oklahoma State University ]

F

ew global challenges are as ripe for multi-sector collaboration as underwater (UW) unexploded
ordnance (UXO) remediation. Millions of metric tons of UXO are lying on and under the seabed
corroding, decaying, and seeping toxic chemicals into the ecosystem—ultimately ending up in
our food. Because most underwater UXO are from WWI and WWII, and given the corrosion rates of
most metals from which ordnance is made, the inevitable problems with ordnance dumped, sunk, and
fired into bodies of water (mostly in coastal regions) are catching up with us. The urgency is exacerbated by biochemical changes in oceans due to climate change that increase rates of corrosion and
other processes. Meanwhile, maritime technologies in several sectors have reduced the barrier of
entry even for small companies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to partner with militaries,
corporations, and nations, large and small. With combined resources, expertise, and knowledge, these
partnerships can remediate the ecological, economic, explosive, and human health hazards caused by
underwater UXO. While some technological gaps exist in detection, disposal, and removal operations,
the most significant barriers are political and economic. Nevertheless, multi-sector collaboration combined with innovation from maritime and explosives experts offers some unexplored opportunities to
increase health, wealth, and safety for all.

Why UW UXO? Why Now?
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Figure 1. Documented marine sites with munitions present include conventional weapons, chemical weapons, and UXO. Note that
the map resolution is coarser than the number of actual munitions dumps, e.g., the letter h has 148 UXO dumpsites.
Figure courtesy of Frontiers in Marine Science.1
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Underwater ordnance presents obvious hazards to
fishermen, divers, vessels, and others in coastal regions.
While some are unlikely to detonate if they were dumped
from storage configurations as a means of disposal,
other UW UXO sites contain missiles, torpedoes, mines,
bombs, and other munitions that were once fired but
failed to function as designed—these present the greatest
risk, since small disturbances could result in catastrophe.
Even dumped ordnance, however, leaks toxic chemicals
from hydrocarbon compounds such as RDX and TNT.
These chemicals and byproducts (after partial decomposition in the local areas) result in lethal reactions with
the surrounding ecosystem that affect coral, marine
mammals, and fish. In turn, these point source contaminants get into the local human population’s food supply, particularly in coastal regions, which tend to rely heavily on seafood. If
the perceived threat to public health spreads, contaminated food
supplies could result in economic devastation that would wipe out
the entire fishing industry.
Over the last few decades, the urgency has increased to a point
that health and economic risks will reach national or even regional
levels. This increase in concern is due primarily to two factors: (1)
increased industrial activity in the maritime environment (offshore wind farms, dredging, and laying of seabed infrastructure);
and (2) the corrosion rates of metals used for ordnance casings.
Approximately eighty years have passed since countries dumped
WWII UXO and one hundred years since countries dumped WWI
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UXO and chemical weapons. Given corrosion rates of carbon steels,
aluminum, and other relevant metals encasing these hazards, what
used to be inevitable is now imminent. According to a 2018 study
in Indonesia involving university and government scientists analyzing corrosion in steel and galvanized steel, corrosion rates are
often logarithmic with higher initial rates until a steady state rate is
achieved. For example, for the first month, galvanized steel can corrode between 7 and 9 mm per year (mpy) and mild steel can corrode
as quickly as 25.5–29.5 mpy.3
After that initial period with higher corrosion rates, an oxide film
forms due to cathodic and anodic reactions, as well as biological
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Figure 2. Underwater UXO survey by NGOs in the Pacific Ocean.
Figure courtesy of Chalres Brown, Platinum East.
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Figure 3. Dimensions of 122 mm OF-462 projectile.
Figure courtesy of Defence Technology. 2
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growth, so the rate stabilizes for years
or decades.4 For steady state corrosion rates after the oxide film forms,
several studies corroborate approximately 0.1 mpy of corrosion on metals
Find
such as steel.5,6,7 Thus, the majority of
Industry
UXO, chemical weapons, and related
Government
hazards likely have between 8 and
Assess
10 mm of deterioration due to steady
NGO
state corrosion over 80 to 100 years
in addition to what the initial higher
Military
Remove
rates produced. A typical UXO such
as the 122 mm OF-462 projectile in
Academia
Figure 3 has a wall thickness ranging
Dispose
from a couple millimeters up to 15 or
more millimeters.8 Assuming worst
case conditions, WWII UXO dumped
in 1945 could already have corroded sufficiently to result in toxic
chemical leakage in the 1950s, with a more reasonable estimate
ranging from 80 to 150 years for most ordnance. Other factors also
play a role in determining corrosion rates such as depth and salinity,
as well as pH, which recently has increased due to climate change
and ocean acidification, which in turn increases the rates of reaction involved in corroding ordnance shells.9
Even with reliable models, in situ measurements of oceanographic conditions and ordnance reconnaissance from trained
experts are critical. Corrosion rates (and therefore the data to feed
risk analysis) are based on variables such as water depth, bathymetry, temperature, salinity, dissolved oxygen levels, pH, conductivity, sediment transport conditions, tidal and current activity,
presence of bio-deposits, and exposure to climatological changes.
This variability of conditions in underwater UXO remediation
emphasizes the importance of corporations and governments—
who have resources and personnel to do large area sweeps to
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Figure 4. Multi-sector assessment of underwater UXO assets
and capabilities. The colors presented indicate which sector
has a significant strength or advantage in that attribute.
Figure courtesy of the author.

localize UXO sites and collect imagery—to partner with universities, NGOs, and local governments who have historical knowledge
of a particular area of interest.
One example of universities and NGOs partnering is demonstrated by the recent establishment of the Oklahoma State
University (OSU) Institute for Global Explosive Hazard Mitigation.
OSU is partnering with Johns Hopkins University, Golden West
Humanitarian Foundation, Platinum East, and Bomb Techs
Without Borders to conduct research in EOD tools, provide postconflict trauma support, and even conduct explosive remediation
operations of ground and underwater threats. While striving to
make the world safer, the partnerships create an environment for
students and practitioners to develop themselves through graduate
education, meaningful research, and global networks of experts.10

The Whole Is Greater Than the Sum of the Parts
It is tempting to blame the militaries of the world for dumped
munitions. They developed, tested, and discarded UXO, munitions filled with chemical agents, and other hazards throughout
preparation for war and in peace time as items became expensive
to store and eventually unserviceable. The reality is that militaries
do not have the “capacity, skill set, funding, or mandate” to assess
environmental hazards of underwater UXO, prioritize remediation, and unilaterally execute removal and disposal procedures.11
NGOs dedicated to the removal and remediation of UXO do
have the mandate and skillsets to focus on the problem but often
lack the capacity and funding. Governments do not always include
mitigation of environmental hazards directly or indirectly derived
from underwater UXO; however, the UXO often originates from
nations whose governments do have the funding. Furthermore,
many militaries apply (or could apply) substantial resources toward
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the problem. Alternatively, whereas large companies from the private sector such as those in the oil and gas industry do not have the
incentive to remove UXO since there is little profit in doing so, they
do have the funding to finance remediation efforts as well as the
skillsets in subsea and seabed detection technologies. Many tools
such as synthetic aperture sonar (SAS), magnetometers, gradiometers, magnetic anomaly detector (MAD), and sub-bottom profilers are used in infrastructure maintenance and natural resource
exploration. Their surface platforms and unmanned systems also
have the skillsets and capacity to conduct large-scale remediation
operations with sufficient standoff to minimize risk to personnel.
For removal or disposal, environmental groups and local governments are often concerned that countercharging UW UXO
will result in worse problems such as irreversible damage to coral
and other marine life. However, other technologies have been

explored and some are quite mature
# Commonalities Industry Government NGO
Military
Academia
with years or decades of datapoints. To
Industry
9
6
9
3
minimize blast effects from ordnance
Government
9
8
9
6
disposal by countercharge, divers can
place bubble curtains around the detonaNGO
6
8
8
6
tion site, especially between the site and
Military
9
9
8
4
any nearby marine life or property. The
Academia
3
6
6
4
bubbles escaping a pressurized hose have
significant blast effect reduction such
that coral, fish, or infrastructure located meters from a detonation Figure 5. Homophily16 of underwater UXO sectors' attributes.
site even in the hundreds of kilograms can have an exponentially Figure courtesy of the author.
higher probability of survival after the detonation.12 Sometimes
are even technological advantages NGOs have used, born primarlocal or state governments decide to leave hazards in place, which
ily out of a culture of operating and innovating in financially conmay have made more practical sense twenty years ago when search
strained organizations. Academic institutions offer search and
and removal technologies were less mature and corrosion was less
detection technologies, novel means of UXO removal, and a wide
likely. For example, the state of Hawaii’s Department of Land and
array of environmental assessment technologies and techniques.
Natural Resources announced in 2020 that it will wait until nonexWhile there is likely a company, NGO, or military that has
plosive removal options are available to remove hundreds to thouattributes in each of the categories (funding, technology, access,
sands of tons of ordnance in a crater off the coast of Maui used
and knowledge) for each of the fundamental phases of underas bombing practice by the US military in WWII, citing concerns
water UXO remediation (find, assess, remove, dispose), Figure 4
from environmental groups, lawmakers, and community memoffers an analytical framework to assess the problem from a multibers about the coral and marine life near the Molokini Crater.13
sector perspective. While this chart is notional based on a literature
However, combining expertise from industry, military, and acareview on a broad, international scale, analysts and practitioners
demia on various low-tech solutions for explosive and chemical
can use this framework on a regional, national, or local level to
hazards can lead to removal of ordnance in a way that is safe to
assess where industry, government, military, NGO, and academic
people, wildlife, and the environment.14
organizations have strengths and weaknesses in different areas.
Because no single sector has all the financial
resources, technological expertise, access,
placement, authorities, and local knowledge of
underwater UXO on a global or regional scale,
multi-sector collaboration is critical.
Each sector has their strengths. Maritime industries such as oil
and gas corporations have copious amounts of funding and modern technologies for search and detection.
Various companies have vast capacities to finance NGOs, academic studies, and governmental or military efforts in underwater
UXO remediation; indeed, some even have the fiduciary responsibility since unintended consequences (detonation, toxic leakage
into the ecosystem) would not be in the best interest of companies’
shareholders. UW UXO remediation may be the primary mission
for some companies or just one division of operations. Frequently,
companies form strategic partnerships for either a single project or
enduring relationships.15
Governmental bodies (for purposes of this analysis, excluding the
military and defense departments) have the knowledge and access
to assess public health hazards to the ecosystem and food supply.
It may even be a politically beneficial policy to improve remediation efforts on UXO since coastal nations rely heavily on the fishing
industry for economic development.
NGOs offer significant value in access and knowledge based on
their sustained presence in a region as well as persistent investment (in time, money, and people) in a particular UXO site. There

Figure 6. SNMCMG1 conducts HODOPS in France.
Figure courtesy of NATO.19
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Figure 7. U.S. Marine Corps Littoral Explosive Ordnance Neutralization (LEON) assets remove WWII ordnance from littoral zones
in the Republic of Palau as part of a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team. 21
Figure courtesy of United States Marine Corps. 22

More importantly, once an assessment is completed at the
appropriate level for single or multiple UXO sites, collaboration
plans will help optimize resources, authorities, and expertise. For
example, based on the multi-sector assessment from Figure 4, the
chart in Figure 5 totals the number of common areas in which each
sector has similar strengths or the homophily16 of each sector’s
attributes in relation to the others. The highest numbers show the
intersection of two sectors that should share best practices, such as
government/industry and military/industry, since they have similar strengths but have different missions. The lowest scores such
as industry/academia and military/academia indicate that these
groups may not always have the most overlap in strengths; therefore, they must work together the most in order to leverage complimentary resources, expertise, access, and technology.
A recipe for success that has been demonstrated by strategic
partnerships usually has several key ingredients:
• local governments and stakeholders interested in supporting explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) efforts and providing
local knowledge and access to UXO/EOD technicians
• NGOs with a long-term presence in areas that also have local
knowledge of the UXO sites and have developed relationships with local populations, governments, and industries
• militaries, and/or international coalitions (i.e., NATO) providing EOD and UXO technicians with dive capabilities and
autonomous or towed survey equipment, explosive charges,
and other key matériel for operations

•

industry partners providing financial support to NGOs and
local governments, and matériel for the UXO remediation
effort
• academia from nearby or international universities collecting environmental and survey data for analysis to assess
hazards and progress throughout remediation operations as
well as developing new technologies and techniques (often
funded by governments and industry)
This mixture of different sectors all providing their own
strengths does not imply that all NGOs are poorly funded, or that
militaries cannot also have long-term presence. But militaries
tend to utilize forces in exercises and deployments for UW UXO
remediation, but not usually for full, multi-year tours, especially
in remote locations. Nevertheless, organizations such as NATO
leverage resources, platforms, and professionals to conduct historical ordnance disposal operations (HODOPS) such as in Figure
6, which included U.S. (EOD Mobile Unit 8), French, Portuguese,
and Latvian navies disposing of WWII bottom mines, some of
which were found by local fishermen.17 Other times, in the course
of laying telecommunications cables in which dredging operations uncover UXO, corporations will provide funding to private
UXO companies or NGOs to clear the hazards prior to continuing
development.18
In the Asia-Pacific, arguably the most heavily littered region for
UW UXO, various components of U.S. EOD forces collaborate with
allies and partners, as well as NGOs, to clear ordnance as safely as
possible for both personnel and the environment.20

Conclusion
First, consider technical factors of ordnance corrosion, biochemical consequences of explosive fillers once leaked, and
oceanographic processes in vicinity of the UXO site to prioritize
operations. In general, corrosion will be faster when pH is higher,
the site is in shallower water, and tidal activities are rapid.
Second, when forming a coalition across sectors to reduce UW
UXO, first conduct an assessment at the appropriate level and
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scope. For a local region or single site, assess NGOs, industries,
and nearby EOD assets to see who has resources, expertise, technologies, and access to quickly remediate the highest risk items.
Leverage governments and academic institutions for environmental assessment methods to both prioritize operations and monitor
progress throughout remediation efforts. NGOs are usually in the
business of developing local relationships and staying in an area

Figure 8. U.S. Navy EOD Mobile Unit 5 technician operating a remotely operated vehicle during humanitarian mine action
operations with Sri Lanka Navy partners.
Figure courtesy of United States Navy. 23

for extended periods of time (sometimes decades), and can use
their access and knowledge to quickly find UXO sites and utilize
local labor, resources, and innovative techniques from recognized
experts in the field. Oil, gas, telecommunications, and other industries offer financial resources (either as a benefactor for philanthropic purposes or as a resource sponsor due to mutual interests
in clearing UXO) as well as relevant technologies such as searching
equipment and vessels.
Finally, militaries offer expertise in EOD operations, searching
equipment, explosive materials for countercharging, and a clearly
defined mandate to dispose or remove explosive hazards. When
these various parties learn from each other when their capabilities overlap, and partner on projects when their capabilities do not
overlap, optimal utilization of resources can lead to less unintended
detonations from fishing activity, less toxic chemicals in the water,
cleaner fish for the population’s food supply, and more economic
activity for the region. It just takes some innovation and willingness to collaborate with nontraditional partners to get after it.
See endnotes page 71
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